An Expose' of V-22 "Facts" - Col. Dunn refutes the program manager

An Expose’ of V-22 “Facts”
A Review of Paper written by Col Schultz (USMC), Criticizing the Press.
This review by the V-22 Red Ribbon Panel was prepared with the intent to clarify and
correct many of the “views”, outright falsehoods and Contractor Public Relations material
used by Col Schultz in his treatment of the Press. (Our Comments are in BOLD face after
each statement of “facts”.)
Harry P Dunn (Col USAF ret)
Coordinator, V-22 Red Ribbon Panel
19 June, 2002
PMA-275, 301-757-5161
Col Dan Schultz
V-22 Program Manager
Subject: There have been several allegations made against the V-22 in the press
recently. The allegations and the facts are presented below.
Article 1: "
Eased Standards Fix Osprey"
Raleigh News and Observer - Mr. Joseph Neff
A careful reading of this article clearly refers to the numerous System Requirements on the V-22 that have
been deferred or deleted.
Opening Statement:
_
The V-22 has met or exceeded all key performance parameters (KPPs). No KPPs have been deleted from the
current ORD.
Mr. Neff did not address the ‘KKP’s as suggested here by Col Schultz - this Marine Corps tactic has
been a stock in trade technique of changing the focus in defense of actual, real problems.
_
Changes were made to the ORD to delete unnecessary requirements as well as add new, more stringent
requirements. This is part of the normal requirements maturation process that takes place in every aircraft
development program.
When did Col Schultz
unilaterally decide that requirements associated with autorotation, combat
maneuvering, protection from Nuclear, Biological, Chemical design, and others, were “unnecessary
requirements
”
? Exactly what were the un-stated new
“more stringent requirements” added, and by what
authority? His last statement is gratuitous to sidetrack the reader from the issues addressed in the article.
1. Allegation
:
"The Navy has lowered its performance requirements"
Fact
:
_
All Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs) undergo periodic review to keep pace with user
requirements. The V-22 is no exception.
_
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development and Acquisition endorsed the Panel to Review
the V-22ís recommendation that the requirements be validated and prioritized, and those that rank poorly in cost/
benefit be deleted. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved these changes, and concurs with the
Joint Requirements Review Working Group and the Program Managers plan to continue identifying the potential
high payoff/cost benefit requirement trades throughout the ORD development
process. The use of time-phased
requirements in support of evolutionary acquisition will best serve joint warfighting needs.
These statements are gratuitous given that after an expenditure of some $13+ Billion of taxpayer money, the
Program Office has now reduced several safety oriented aspects and requirements, while at the same time
increasing unit costs.
2. Allegation
: "
The Navy no longer requires that the V-22 be able to land safely in helicopter mode without
power."
This refers to the requirement of autorotation when in helicopter mode
-
a fundamental and critical safety
requirement for ALL military and civilian rotorcraft, which has now been deleted from ORD at the V-22
Program and NASA requests!
Fact
:
_
The V-22 spends 70 percent of its time in airplane mode where it has the capability to perform a survivable all-
engine out landing.
This is an untested, invalidated effort to justify the deletion of autorotational capability
with the subsequent
direct risks to Pilots/Crews of the V-22.
We see here the change of specific subject, a standard approach by
the USMC in responding to the many questions/statements on the V-22.
The inference is that since the V-22 spends more time in the airplane mode, it is therefore not necessary to
be able to autorotate in helicopter mode. What about the guys who are flying the 30 percent of the time?
Tough. I Guess.
Equally IMPORTANT is the fact that an emergency “survivable” all-engine out landing is not exactly
a routine operation - which all pilots must learn to do in flight training as is done in other transport aircraft. This
rationale for deleting a requirement for autorotation has not been demonstrated. Perhaps someone will tell us
exactly when and how this will be done. A safe landing with two engines out is totally dependant on at least
two factors to preclude a catastrophe.
After dual engine failure, it is mandatory that some hydraulic/electric function is available to rotate the nacelles
to about 60 degrees to make a landing in airplane mode; because the V-22
cannot land
without tilting the two 38 foot diameter propellers without a disaster
. Equally important is that a
a relatively hard surface is required to attempt a landing a safe landing. This is hardly a good reason to claim
that this is justification for deleting an autorotation requirement.
If this is what we call “new technology”, the entire concept of developing safer aircraft has taken
a severe backward 100 year turn!
In addition, the V-22
has
demonstrated the capability to autorotate.
This is “technically” true. The V-22 has demonstrated the ability to fly in helo mode without any power applied
to the rotors. The critical phases of autorotation however, entry and the flare, have
NOT
been demonstrated.
No abrupt power- cut has ever been done in V-22, nor will ever be done, because it is extremely dangerous and
probably not survivable.
A flare in the V-22 has in fact been
attempted
in flight test
!
(Note that this maneuver-- in all helicopters -- can initiate a flare during autorotation and reduce the sink rate
to zero and land safely before the rotor(s) stop.
In testing, the V-22 managed to reduce the autorotation sink rate from 5600 ft/min (that is correct 5600, not
the 3800 as stated by the NASA panel in their report) -- to initiate a flare to a nice manageable 3200 ft/min --
before the power had to be restored to prevent a complete rotor stall -- ending in a catastrophe.
The bottom line here is that they did in fact
initiate
an autorotation -- they simply found that they
could not
initiate a flare and land safely!!
So much for the other 30 %.
_
No similar sized rotorcraft has ever had to demonstrate a full autorotation landing.
This is a complete falsehood. The USMC’s own CH-53, as well as all other military helicopters were tested and
required to demonstrate full autorotational landings safely to the ground at maximum gross weight, as
required under contract. The H-53 has essentially the same empty weight and power as the V-22, and has
demonstrated SAFE autorotational capability to the ground.
_
Likelihood of needing to conduct an autorotative landing in the V-22 is far less than the platforms it's replacing
(i.e. CH-53E losing its tail rotor).
Here we see another change of subject. This “claim” is presumably based on engine failure probability
statistics, and ignores real combat helicopter experience where battle damage and fuel starvation drive the
need for a safe autorotational capability, increasing greatly the probability that an autorotation will need to be
performed.
_
The likelihood of surviving an autorotative landing in the V-22 is comparable to a rotorcraft of similar weight. In
addition, the V-22s crashworthy design features far exceed all conventional rotorcraft.
Completely untrue. Two more “facts” that are both incorrect. That the H-53 has demonstrated safe, survivable
autorotational landings is the real fact. The likelihood of a rotorcraft (V-22) with almost
twice the disk loading
and a rotor inertia less than 1/4 that of an H-53
makes Schultz’s statement misleading and wishful thinking,
and completely contrary to even a basic engineering analysis of the autorotational problem..
3. Allegation
: "
Required protection from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
has been eliminated."
Fact
:
_
NBC overpressure was a very expensive option that did not make sense because:
- Once the aircraft door is opened in an NBC environment, the interior of the aircraft becomes contaminated.
Again, this WAS an ORD requirement from beginning --it has now been eliminated!
The V-22 is NOT
pressurized and, therefore, could not sustain any of the required capabilities without significant weight
penalties. A
similar/related problem involves the lack of oxygen
,
which is NOT available to troops, and so
with troops on-board, the mission
altitude envelope of the V-22 is severely curtailed.
Without
pressurization, and with Oxygen Stations for only the 4 crew members, carrying troops above about 8-
10,000 feet is a severe/foolhardy problem for missions requiring long distances which in turn are normally
accomplished at higher altitudes, where the V-22 is more efficient.
(A close review of the requirements which have been dropped or delayed (e.g. minigun turret), all tend to be
related to the need for additional reduction of
the V-22 weight problems.)
- Troops and aircrew deployed in anticipation of any potential NBC threat will already be wearing protective gear.
Note
:
This is very reassuring, but it does not address limits for altitudes without pressurization, nor oxygen
requirements for troops; and which would have been required if the FAA/Navy MOU had not been canceled by
the Navy.
It is even more important to realized that
this makes V-22 a daytime only NBC environment aircraft, --
since
night vision devices - (NVD)s are incompatible with NBC protective gear! This was one of the main reasons for
the requirement in the first place.
Since the typical USMC mission is at night (by definition), you can surmise the consequences, and the real
reason why "this didn't make sense".
The statement “will be wearing protective gear” is a much larger problem which Col. Schultz does not appear
nor desire to discuss. The “gear” mentioned is very bulky and restrictive for all the crew and troops, and
requires advance preparation and practice for realistic application. The bulk alone will require reduced useful
payloads of combat loaded troops, who already have no place to store their excess combat gear.
4. Allegation
:
“Reliability standards have been changed and lowered.”
Fact
:
_
Reliability standards on the V-22 remain higher than current fleet transport helicopters today.
This is patently absurd. DOTE, GAO
and maintenance
data, when correctly compared, i.e. not with “goals,”
which are far from ever being demonstrated, are in actuality worse than those of the CH-46E, CH-53D, and
even the heavy lift CH-53E.
_
See attached charts comparing Reliability and Maintainability of Block A & B MV-22s with the two aircraft it is
replacing (CH-46E and CH-53D), and the heavy lift CH-53E.
These Charts are attached.
(These two charts were not available, but show Objectives of differing dates in the
future, compared to current data for other helicopters.)
_
The Panel to Review the V-22 recommended the standardization of Reliability, Availability, and Maintenance (RAM) parameters. Mean Flight Hours Between Failure Logistics (MFBFlog) became the primary measure of logistic reliability. MFBFlog of 0.9 hours (Threshold) and 1.2 hours (Objective) is the current standard. Mean Flight Hours Between Abort was restated as Mean Repair Time (Abort) of 4.8 hours. These standards equate to the original mission reliability rate of 85% per 3-hour mission.

Changing parametric measurements not used by other aircraft is a nice way to pick you own FUTURE capabilities. It should be asked at Pax River exactly how many total hours of maintenance work has been done by the contractor and military crews during the first 15 flights and “near 35 hours” as reported by the V- 22 Program Office last month. Given that only 15 flights during some two+ months were accomplished, the total maintenance work and costs would be constructive and useful information.
_
The changes reflect NAVAIR Systems Engineering study of the previous Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)
rate. The original 1.4 metric was based on a selection of various legacy fixed wing and helicopters that were


Source:
http://g2mil.com/An%20EXPOSE%20of%20Facts%20-%20re%20Schultz%20Paper.PDF