Keeping the V-22 Alive - the biggest scandal in US military history

It has been widely reported that the V-22 Osprey will resume testing in May 2002.  However, the big surprise is that no redesigned V-22s are ready for testing.  According to the April 2002 V-22 Report to Congress - pdf (it's not blank, click down after it loads), the only modification to the new test V-22s over the last 16 months was to strengthen the hydraulic lines and upgrade software.  The actual V-22 redesign will occur in three stages over the next six years, in Blocks A, B, & C.  Block A aircraft will not be ready for flight testing until the end of 2003, and the final Block C changes will not be done until 2008, assuming no delays occur.  Operational Evaluation by Marine crews are tentatively scheduled to start in FY2005.        This is why the Bell-Boeing team and some Marine Generals continually emphasize that testing has no timelines, and will be "event driven" and not "schedule driven".  In fact, they've established a scheme where NAVAIR (the Naval Aviation development section) must approve each phase of testing to certify safety. The report to Congress lays this out in section 3.2.10.3 where NAVAIR  must "assess operational risk factors before authorizing increased risk flights (e.g. assaults, night flying, weather flying)."        Last year, there were many statements that aggressive flight testing to determine if the V-22 was safe would begin in April 2002, which became April 29, then May 10.  The Report to Congress reveals that flight testing will not begin until August 2002.  NAVAIR explained that pilot requalification will take three months. However, since the final redesigned V-22 will not be ready until 2008, any real testing may be "unsafe", and could result in a career-ending crash for senior officers at NAVAIR.  So the V-22 will simply repeat the same "safe" tests that were performed in the 1990s, and if anyone asks why serious tests have not been conducted, they can point at NAVAIR, and claim the moral high ground of "Safety First".  Even if a V-22 crashes during regular flights, they can point out it was the "old" V-22 design, and the problem is being corrected.  Meanwhile, another $12 billion will flow into the pockets of Bell-Boeing over the next six years while dozens of new V-22s roll off the production line and into storage hangers. Brownout testing       Since the V-22's small rotors produce three times more downwash than helicopters, many pilots have expressed concern about "brownouts", which occur when dirt and dust fill the air blocking all vision. (note the water in the photo above) The US military has damaged several helicopters in Afghanistan when hard landing occurred due to brownouts.  The extent of this problem with the V-22 appears serious, but according section 3.2.6.2 of the Report to Congress: "The planned development testing does not include unimproved site ops where brownout is typically encountered..."  The reports suggests that brownouts can be avoided by using "non-hover landings." Air Combat Maneuvering        One of the problems of the V-22 is that its unstable design does not allow it to maneuver aggressively in hostile landing zones.  Section 5.5.1.2 of the Report to Congress states this problem has been solved.  The Bell-Boeing team pressured the Department of Defense to create a term, "Defensive Maneuvering; which is defined as "...maneuvers performed within the design specifications of the aircraft performance "  In short, if something can fly, it's ready for combat.   The V-22 Redesign Ignores Vortex Ring Problem       Experts were unable to develop a solution to the Osprey's fatal "vortex ring" problem, which causes the V-22 to fall from the sky if it descends too fast at slow speeds.  The real problem is stalling one of the asymmetric rotors , just like stalling a wing of an aircraft, but calling the problem "vortex ring" is preferred by Bell-Boeing since it sounds minor.  They concluded that a device which can measure low forward air speeds could help the pilot avoid this fatal problem, and recommended developing a prototype. (see Section 3.2.35 of the Report to Congress.)          The February 2002 issue of Armed Forces Journal, explains: "since the V-22 has asymmetric rotors on its wing tips, if one of them encounters the vortex ring state phenomenon before the other, the aircraft will be inclined to roll over.  That's one of the reasons why V-22s are presently limited to a rate of descent of less than 800 feet per minute.  While that would be adequate for a commercial operation, it's far short of what the military needs -- several thousand feet per minute -- during tactical insertions."  This was hidden in an article about Optical Air Data Systems, where Phil Rogers  describes his efforts to save the V-22 program.   Rogers said: "Right now, there's nothing that can measure low forward speeds -- below 40 knots -- accurately enough to let them get to that envelope, but not into it. The standard pneumatic systems that are used for that purpose are not sensitive enough to measure below 40 knots.  The other problem with pneumatic systems is that they are in the  rotor wash.  So unless you have a high forward speed, the rotor wash dominates any measurements that are made."      Rogers' company is conducting a feasibility demonstration to determine if a laser can measure low forward air speed.  This story reveals that after 20 years of tiltrotor development, and two years after the vortex ring state problem was proven a fatal flaw, no solution has been developed.  V-22 pilots cannot rapidly descend for combat missions because no instrument can accurately measure forward airspeed to warn them they may flip over.  Until this problem is solved, there is no point in restarting V-22 testing, or continuing to build flawed V-22s.  This problem has already been studied for years and the only hope is a laser theory which has produced a "feasibility study".  In short, a laser measurement device may be perfected within a few years, which may help pilots avoid the V-22's fatal vortex ring problem.  Meanwhile, combat maneuvering will not be tested in the V-22 because NAVAIR will rule it unsafe until a low forward airspeed measurement device is invented.        The V-22's NATOPS (operating manual) used by ALL pilots of the V-22 clearly states on Page I-4-13, WARNING "Air Combat Maneuvering and Aerobatics are PROHIBITED."  This is a simple and direct mandate. There is little room for argument. It is in essence a form of regulation, the violation of which can lead to an investigation by the Navy JAG, along with some form of punishment, transfer, loss of ratings -- or worse.  NATOPS provides further evidence that the "Flight Envelope" of the V-22 is highly restrictive, with words such as: "During Maneuvering at low airspeed, Accelerated Stall can be achieved at moderate bank angles and/or load factor." "Because of the inherent instability of the tiltrotor ---" "Potential energy cannot be stored in the propulsion system" (as helicopters do) "Practice Autorotations, to include entry or glide , are PROHIBITED" "Abrupt multi-axis control inputs are PROHIBITED"       Here are more worrisome NATOPS extracts - pdf  These limits are an admission that the V-22's fundamental instability problems remain, so pilots are directed not to make abrupt movements or descend rapidly, lest they roll over and drop from the sky.  When a US Army MH-47 helicopter was hit by a small rocket while landing in Afghanistan, the pilot yanked the stick so abruptly to escape that a Navy SEAL was thrown out the back ramp.  If this were a V-22, the pilot would have crashed the entire aircraft, killing everyone on board because: "Abrupt multi-axis control inputs are PROHIBITED" The Osprey is unarmed      Even if a new device allows a V-22 to safely and SLOWLY descend into a combat landing zone; this is where 91% of combat losses occur.  Transports have a "door gunner" on each side who shoot a rapid-fire machine gun (called mini-guns, right) at enemy positions below to "suppress" enemy fires.  When several helicopters land in formation, the volume of fire pouring down is impressive.  However, the V-22 will have no door gunners because the tandem rotor design blocks half their view and field of fire.  No one wants a door gunner attempting to shoot around a massive rotor and wing sticking out the side of an aircraft; the rotor wash would affect his accuracy anyway.      The V-22 program has dodged this issue.  The original explanation was that it could be added later in the program.  In the 1990s, they convinced Marine Corps leaders that a gun could make the pilot too aggressive, thus endangering his passengers.  When General Jones become Commandant in 1999, he insisted the V-22 must have a gun to provide suppressive fire.  As a result, Jones was told a rapid fire GAU-19 .50 caliber machine gun would be mounted on a turret under the nose and fired by the co-pilot. (similar to the 20mm gun on the Cobra attack helo at left)  This is not a simple task since the 608lbs GAU-19 with several hundred rounds of ammunition and the electric pivoting nose chin will take a lot of space under the crowded cockpit.  The extra of weight and bulbous chin will also reduce speed and performance.      The past 16-month delay for the V-22 redesign was the ideal time to add the gun into the test aircraft.  This is important because the gun's weight and vibration while firing will affect aircraft performance.  Since the GAU-19 is a proven gun, there is no reason to delay.  However, testing will resume without the GAU-19.  In fact, the current plan delays adding the gun until the very end of testing in 2008.  The Bell-Boeing team may imply the GAU-19 is something which can just be bolted on at the very end.  If its that simple, why not bolt it on now?  Obviously, there is a major problem with adding the GAU-19, so Bell-Boeing will continue to dodge this issue until it goes away.  As a result, if a safe V-22 is ever developed, it will fly into combat completely unarmed.  Since the V-22s are much faster than the Cobra attack helicopters that escort transports, they will have to fly as slow as helicopters and negate their only advantage. The Tilt-rotor may Tilt sideways aboard ship       While in flight "the location of the engines, gear boxes and rotors at the wing tips causes relatively high roll and yaw inertia".  This is a direct quote from NATOPS section 9.2.  This also causes serious problems aboard ship.  The roll of a ship or gusts from nearby aircraft can cause a V-22 on ship to tilt over on the deck and squash sailors and Marines nearby.  A NAVAIR report by Kurt Long -pdf states this danger is "VERY significant" and "...could prohibit ALL shipboard ops."  This problem was ignored in the redesign because no solution exists. STOL Payload and Range      Most people are confused by the V-22's payload and range.  For example, why can it lift 20,000lbs of payload internally, but only 15,000 externally.  Here are the official maximum take-off weights: 47,500 lb Vertical Takeoff/Landing (VTOL)* 55,000 lb Short Takeoff/Landing (STOL) 60,500 lb Self Deploy STO *Last year, the new V-22 project manager inexplicitly raised the max VTOL weight to 52,600, while the V-22 was grounded.        Apparently, if the V-22 must take off vertically like a helicopter, its maximum take-off weight drops by 7500lbs.  When operating from large land bases, STOL "rolling" short take-offs are no problem. STOL take-offs from LHA/LHD carriers are possible if  the deck is cleared.  However, this becomes very difficult during amphibious operations when 30 other aircraft are operating from a ship.  In Fleet operations, no one will ever attempt a rolling take-off with a heavy payload because cargo comes in many sizes and forms, and mistakes about weight are common.  A helicopter or V-22 attempting to lift something vertically quickly learns he cannot lift off, so they off-load some weight.  However, an overloaded V-22 attempting a rolling STOL take-off, or one whose engines are not providing 100% power, may roll off the deck and plunge into the sea.  The first time that happens, rolling V-22 take-offs from ships will be banned forever.  AV-8B Harrier jets make rolling take-offs all the time, but they have wings for added lift, know exactly how much their fuel and ordnance weighs, and can eject if problems develop.      So whenever Bell-Boeing mentions the V-22 range or payload, they are probably assuming STOL.  A report on the V-22 sea trials by V-22 test pilot LtCol John Rudzis reveals the maximum STOL take-off weight attempted was only 47,300 lbs, nearly 8000lbs less than advertised.  He also mentioned that : "A left seat landing under relative winds over deck of 355 deg relative and twenty-five knots resulted in a roll excursion of thirty-seven degrees angle of bank while only ten feet above the deck level. Only that the left rotor was over the water and full power had been applied to initiate a climb, prevented the nacelle or rotor from impacting the ship. Further testing in these conditions was suspended until this event could be thoroughly investigated." Fewer V-22s can fit on ship      Few people realize the V-22 weighs almost as much as the powerful CH-53E, which can carry twice as much.  The V-22 can automatically perform a contortionist routine to save space, although maintenance officers cringe when shown the photo at right.  They know that after a few years of wear and countless automatic folds, every moving part eventually breaks.        Nevertheless, Navy ships can only carry so much weight before they become unstable.  This is particularly important for objects high on ship, like on the flight deck.  As a result, some Marine leaders have just discovered the Corps cannot deploy twelve V-22s aboard ship with a standard MEU composite squadron.  So assuming that V-22s ever become safe, a MEU can deploy with no more than eight V-22s, instead of today's twelve smaller CH-46Es.  Actually, the CH-46E has more internal cargo space than the V-22, it just weighs much less.        This is why the LHA/LHD Replacement program recently emerged.  Some people want to spend billions of dollars to design a new class of bigger flattop amphibs just to carry a MEU composite squadron with twelve V-22s, rather than continuing to buy modern LHDs.  The LHDs are already larger than any World War II aircraft carriers, and larger than any foreign aircraft carriers.  Even if this expensive idea for larger ships is adopted, it will be ten years before the first appears in the Fleet, and 35 years before the last "undersized" LHD retires, along with the last V-22s. Bell and Boeing Lack Confidence in Tiltrotors      One of the selling points for the V-22 is that tiltrotor technology will revolutionize civilian aviation.  Bell teamed up with Augusta several years ago to produce a smaller tiltrotor, called the BA609 (photo of mock-up at right). They decided to use the standard 3000psi hydraulic system, rather than the new 5000psi system which has plagued the V-22.  Many were surprised the V-22 redesign kept the leak-prone 5000psi system.      Bell claimed to have orders for 80 BA609 aircraft for VIP use, which doesn't require as stringent safety specifications as passenger aircraft FAA certified for commercial use.  When the V-22 crashes raised questions about the safety of the tiltrotor,  Bell did not press on with the BA609 to demonstrate its confidence in tiltrotor technology.  Instead, Bell halted plans to begin BA609 flight tests and seek FAA certification, and recently stopped all work on the BA609.        Boeing is the world's largest maker of commercial aircraft.  Why isn't Boeing marketing a commercial version of the V-22?  This would not require research, testing, or development funding.  They can simply put passenger seats in V-22s which can come off the established production line and sell them to airlines, just as companies have done with military helicopters.  However, Boeing has made no effort to market a commercial version of the V-22.  Why?       Helicopter expert Harry Dunn says the reason is the V-22 can never pass FAA safety tests due to its unstable design.  Meanwhile, Boeing is working on a new VTOL canard wing design where the entire wing can also spin like a big helicopter blade (left).  So if tilt-rotor technology is safe and revolutionary, why has it been dismissed by every foreign and domestic aircraft maker, including Bell and Boeing, the makers of the V-22?  The Russians built two tiltrotor prototypes for testing, and determined the concept was unsafe. Why has the V-22 been rejected by the US Army, US Coast Guard, and recently the US Navy?  The US Air Force is still officially in the program only because Congress adds money each year for the CV-22.       Meanwhile, Bell-Boeing has been sued by several family members of those killed by the V-22 whose lawyers said they could prove that executives knew the V-22 was unsafe.  Bell-Boeing denied this charge, yet refused a chance to refute these charges in open court and settled each case, all with a confidentially agreement which required that facts be withheld from the public. The Navy MH-60S is superior        Recently, Congress began asking about alternatives to the V-22.  The Marine Corps dodged this issue, then offered the European EH-101 as a possibility, knowing that Congress would never support the purchase of a foreign aircraft.  The Corps ignored the new Sikorsky S-92 helicopter, which has been sold to Ireland and Communist China.  It claimed it would take years to develop a "navalized" version of the Army Blackhawk, ignoring the Navy HH-60H Seahawk, which has been in service for years, and an advanced version, the MH-60S Knighthawk, which just entered Navy service.  The Knighthawk can carry a crew of four and 13 passengers or 10,000lbs of cargo, which is twice the payload of the older CH-60A Blackhawk in service with the US Army.           The Marine Corps can simply sign a production contract to join in the Navy buy for Knighthawks in FY2003.  Navy H-60 spare parts and training programs have been functioning for years, and the Corps already operates eight VH-60s as part of the Presidential helicopter squadron.  If the Marine Corps joined the Army, Navy, and Air Force by adopting the Sikorsky H-60 series for basic transport, all services would save money and improve interoperability.  This year, the Navy bought 17 MH-60S for $17 million each, they would cost even less if purchased at a higher rate with a joint Marine Corps buy.  The MH-60S can carry almost as much as the MV-22, at one-sixth the price.  The Navy is impressed with the MH-60S and will use them to replace their CH-46D helicopters, rather than buying 48 HV-22s.      Adopting the H-60 design would allow the Marine Corps to add a new capability by modifying some MH-60S as EH-60E electronic warfare or MH-60Q Medevac helicopters, using components already in service with the Army.  The Corps can also buy some MH-60Ks (right), which have larger fuel tanks and refueling probes which allow it to fly much farther than the MV-22.  Another advantage is that the MH-60S is equipped to carry 16 Hellfire anti-tank missiles.  This would quadruple the airborne anti-tank firepower of the Marine Corps.  For example, MEU composite squadrons which the Corps maintains forward-deployed include four Cobra attack helicopters which could be supported by twelve MH-60S carrying Hellfires and machine guns.      The MH-60S Knighthawk is also far superior as an assault aircraft.  First, it is smaller and thus harder to hit.  Second, it can safely descend three times faster than the V-22 with no worry of flipping over.  Third, it has machine guns for suppressing enemy fire.  Fourth, it has side cargo doors to allow Marines to leap out immediately, rather than wait their turn to file out the back ramp of a V-22.  The Army suffered many casualties using CH-47s in Afghanistan when two were shot up as soldiers waited to file out the back ramp.  Fifth, the downwash from the V-22 is so bad that Marines must lie down until the V-22 leaves, and rope ladder extractions are impossible.  Finally, a $17 million MH-60S is easier to replace than a $118 million V-22, which is why former Marine James Webb opposed the V-22 program in the 1980s when he was Secretary of the Navy.  The US lost thousands of helicopters during the Vietnam conflict; they must be affordable.  The FY 2002 budget provides $1.3 billion for 11 MV-22s ($118 million each) plus $447 million for testing (or $159 million each in annual costs).  The Marine Corps could have purchased 103 MH-60S helicopters with that money. When will the V-22 Scandal end?         The V-22 program was canceled by the Bush administration back in 1989 after two prototype crashes.  After an extensive review, then Navy Secretary Sean O’Keefe told the House Armed Services Committee, "The V-22 cannot be built to meet the requirements specified. It’s an engineering impossibility." However, politics revived the flawed program and another $10 billion was spent on testing and development until two disastrous crashes led to the grounding of the V-22 in December of 2000.  Nevertheless, production was authorized and four billion dollars later the V-22 will fly again, while performing all five phases of aircraft creation simultaneously: research, development, testing, production, and upgrades.  This bizarre arrangement produces a new $159 million V-22 each month which is unsafe to fly.  It rolls off the assembly line and into storage awaiting upgrades, or eventual donation to an aviation museum.  Even if a safe V-22 has not been developed by 2008, the V-22 team will argue that 100 flawed V-22s have already been built, and the Marine Corps cannot afford to cancel the program.        If politicians have such confidence in the V-22, why not announce the first V-22s will become part of the President's VIP helicopter squadron-HMX-1.  This Marine Corps squadron has a secondary mission of testing helicopters, and flying VIPs around the East Coast is much easier for the V-22 than operating from ships or in combat zones.  NAVAIR's website claims "The Osprey's size, speed, range and ability to land in tightly confined areas would create a revolution in the Executive/VIP transport role."  Flying politicians around will prove their confidence in the V-22s safety, yet it's unlikely they will risk their lives in an unsafe aircraft.          Meanwhile, where are the dozens of unflyable V-22s today?  As a final example of how bad this program has become, here is a recent Navy contract announcement. Bell-Boeing Joint Program Office, Patuxent River, Md., is being awarded a not-to-exceed $5,719,000 modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (N00019-00-C-0183) for long-term preservation and storage of 19 V-22 aircraft until Block "A" configuration changes, safe and operational fleet return to flight are developed and implemented on the aircraft prior to delivery.  Work will be performed in Amarillo, Texas, and is expected to be completed by December 2002.  Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity.       That's right, taxpayers will pay Bell almost $6 million dollars to store 19 of their defective V-22s, that's $301,000 for each, just for storage.  The V-22 has become the biggest scandal in US military history, with some $16 billion wasted thus far.  New technology always presents problems, yet many were unsolvable so the project was cancelled.  It's clear the tiltrotor idea has failed, which is why even Bell and Boeing are not building commercial tiltrotor aircraft.  Every month the Bell-Boeing team can stall, it gets another $159 million, payments which are not "event driven".  Unless action is taken, there is no doubt the V-22 will still be testing and developing in 2010.                                             Carlton Meyer  editor@G2mil.com     More details about V-22 flaws can be found in two G2mil articles from last year: The V-22 Fiasco and MV-22 Lies.  Many helicopter experts were so appalled by the findings of the V-22 "Blue Ribbon Panel", which was formed to keep the V-22 program going and consisted of no rotorcraft experts, they formed a "Red Ribbon Panel" to present the truth.  They produced a detailed technical report on the cause of the V-22 crashes which you can read here:  Red Ribbon Panel Study  Their coordinator, Harry P Dunn, is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy - with several months of USMC training - and a retired Colonel in the US Air Force.  He was Flight Test Director of H-3 Jolly Green Rescue helicopter and the world's first In-Flight Refueling for Helicopters Program with some 45 years of direct association with helicopter/rotorcraft/VSTOL programs.  He contributed to this article and can be reached at Hpdunn@aol.com if anyone wants to discuss technical aspects as to why the V-22 is fundamentally flawed.  ©2002 www.G2mil.com Letters UPDATE Osprey's scheduled test flight is postponed Plan still envisions takeoffs in May, but adjustments are needed By RICHARD WHITTLE / The Dallas Morning News  05/09/2002 WASHINGTON – The V-22 Osprey's scheduled return to the sky has been put off until later this month, the program manager said Wednesday. The Pentagon had planned to get the tilt-rotor transport back into the air on Thursday, its first flight since it was grounded after two fatal crashes. But some final mechanical adjustments have slowed the schedule, said Marine Col. Daniel Schultz, V-22 program manager. "Our goal has always been to fly in May," Col. Schultz said. "Whether it's the first part of May or the last part remains to be seen." "We're part of a long-term test program, and whether we fly today or three weeks from today really doesn't matter," he added, speaking by telephone from Patuxent River Naval Air Station, Md., where the tests will be conducted. The flight testing, scheduled to last through 2003, will decide the future of the Osprey, built by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. of Fort Worth and Boeing Co. Undersecretary of Defense Pete Aldridge, who has authority to cancel the program, has voiced skepticism about the Osprey but said the plane could win his approval if the tests go well. The $40 billion program has been in limbo since 23 Marines were killed in two V-22 crashes in 2000. The Marines want to replace their Vietnam-era troop transport helicopters with the Osprey, which tilts two huge wingtip rotors upward to take off and land like a helicopter and forward to fly like an airplane. Following numerous investigations and a review by a special commission, the Osprey's flight control software has been revised. And hydraulic and electric lines in the aircraft's nacelles – large wingtip structures that hold the engines and rotors – have been rerouted to avoid chafing that was blamed for hydraulic leaks. Col. Shultz blamed the postponement on the discovery that turning on the power in the hydraulic system had caused the lines to move slightly, much as a garden hose moves when the water is turned on. Additional clamps and brackets were installed to solve the problem, he said. "Once we've powered the rotors up and turned the rotors, we expect to find some other things." In any event, Col. Schultz said, "Within the next few weeks, we'll be back in the air." Ed. Stall, stall, stall.  Each month this drags on, the Bell-Boeing team gets another $159 million.  After the FY2003 budget is approved soon, a total of 62 production V-22s will have been funded.  It has always been April 2002 for testing to start; Col Shultz must have "misstated".  As for the delay, are we to believe that they did all that work installing new hoses for 16 months and didn't start the engines to see what happened until May?  They even got the Secretary of the Navy to announce the Osprey was safe and ready to fly on May 9th.  Apparently, the SecNav doesn't read the Dallas Morning News. V-22 Politics      Bravo on your article and guts for taking on the Marine Corps. I used to work for an aerospace company and made the mistake, while talking to some staff people on the Hill, about several very negative aspects of the V-22 program. Most specifically was its fatally flawed ability to cope with any but the mildest form of asymmetrical thrust/lift. I got several threats and one person had the rabid pro V-22 crowd carry a message to me to back off. He told me that I was playing with fire and of course, my company had some big R&D and procurement lines in the authorization and appropriations bills every year. One colleague of mine wrote a critical letter to the editor of an aerospace magazine and the Marine Corps wanted him fired!     The fatal design flaw is the necessity, based on rotor diameter and wing span, to have the rotors too far apart for the torque that they develop. Ask any Marine who flew the OV-10 Bronco (I have a lot of hours as a FAC instructor in it) how far away from the fuselage the props are. They are barely 6 inches and this is to reduce the effects of a loss of power, for any reason, and particularly at low airspeeds (V-22 slowing for landing!).  In all of the accidents, and although the initial failures were all different  (Quantico "fire" in one engine) , Arizona ("loss of lift on one rotor") and New River ("hydraulic problem"), the killer always was the catastrophic loss of control because of asymmetric torque/thrust. And it will always be so. Cross shafting did not work at Quantico because the coupling had burned through, and it will never work if there is a gear box failure on either nacelle. Combat? One 23 mm hit on an engine ought to do the whole load in.      Sorry for the preaching, but like you, I believe that the Marine Corps has sold its soul for a few pieces of silver (read: roles and missions), and it is a tragedy. They now have an appalling lack of integrity. Thank goodness my son decided to resign his commission from the Corps.                                                                                               Name Withheld V-22 Dangers      Where is the fuel intake on the V-22?  If its near the wing which may see-saw while on a ships' deck, it makes hot refueling very dangerous.  Will they have to chain it down each time?  Even that would be hazardous.  Perhaps NATOPS should have a: WARNING: shipboard ops in bad weather or while other aircraft are flying nearby are PROHIBITED. WARNING: this aircraft MUST be chained down before hot refueling aboard ship.                                                                                    J. J. Ed. I received a few e-mails from people VERY CLOSE to V-22 testing.  They noted problems but claimed everything was being fixed.  They complained about many inaccuracies in my article, but the only ones they could name were taken from their V-22 report to Congress in April of 2002.  One e-mail revealed the actual payloads tested are not near those claimed.  He said: "The Operational Requirements document requires the V-22 to be able to carry 8K internally and 10K externally. Thus far the V-22 has demonstrated the capability to internally carry 13K and externally lift 11K."  I asked why they tell everyone it can lift 20,000 lbs internally and 15,000 lbs externally.  He explained that is the goal, something I have never read anywhere.  The only part I may have got wrong was claiming the term "defensive maneuvering" was invented for the V-22 program since it incapable of "combat maneuvering". Osprey's Chin Gun Can't Work      I had been a long time fan of the Osprey since I first saw a drawing of it years ago.  Being an Air Assault infantryman, I liked the idea of getting in and on the ground faster, and getting out faster.  I still like that idea.  I have a friend who is an Air Force PJ, who was a fan of the Osprey as well.  He mentioned the fact that getting to the downed pilot as fast as possible is critical and such a vehicle as the Osprey would be ideal.      You mention many faults of the V-22, and I couldn’t agree more.  The Osprey is a huge failure.  It has become the new military icon of failure like the Sgt York was.  You can’t fly it hard, you can’t fight in it, you can’t fight from it. I think the best use for the V-22 should be to transport Bell/Boeing Execs and the Military staff that are still supporting this project.  Perhaps with a few rides they will understand that this vehicle just isn’t going to cut it.  Problem with that is, realization would come when it’s too late and the V-22 is about to auger into the earth.  They’ll get the Darwin Awards, but that project will still be in effect.       If it is going to be doing search and rescue, it has to have side doors.  Simple as that. Door gunners too. A chin gun?  Gimme a break! If I am being rescued and the baddies are on my tail – I want to be running to the boys that have me covered.  I don’t even want to be running at an aircraft with the copilot laying down suppressive fire from his vision obscured position in the cockpit!                                                                      Ed. I didn't think about the problem of a chin gun in a transport.  It cannot turn toward the enemy to engage while landing, so how can the co-pilot aim the thing?  With a video screen and joy stick, while he's try to help to land in the brownout without flipping over?  When it lands, the gun will be less than a foot off the deck so it cannot fire unless on a flat runway.  V-22 Scandal Homepage Reference: http://g2mil.com/V-22alive.htm

Red Ribbon Panel Study on the Marana accident

V-22 NATOPS, Reports, Issues and how they relate to the Marana Accident                                           (by the Red Ribbon Panel, Jan 2002) The following are the results of our studies to review and determine if there was any direct or indirect connection between: (a) Deleted/deferred flight testing (as reported by last years GAO and DOD/IG Reports), (b) Limits for Pilots in the NATOPS Flight Manual, (c) Performance Test Data and JORD requirements, (d) Potential impact/errors in JAGMAN investigations and conclusions. 1. Background Information a. NATOPS Limitations directly related to the Marana Accident: Normal Load Factor for VTOL/Conversion Mode are -0.5 G to 2.0 G  --- with Max Angle of Bank of 60 Degrees. ("     "     "     "     "    "     "    Airplane Mode"      "    -1.0 G to 3.5 G  ---   "     "    "     "     "     "  "   60-75  Degrees) Note: These limits as related to VTOL/Conversion mode are not supported by actual flight testing. b. Warning concerning Settling with Power in NATOPS states: "Avoid descent rates of 800 ft/min or greater at airspeeds less than 40 KCIAS." There have been several questions asked as to where/how this was decided to be included in the NATOPS Flight Manual. We have found no information based on actual V-22 flight testing for determination of these limits, which are related to VRS. There has been no explanation as to how these Limits were determined as they relate specifically to the V-22 Tiltrotor. The only indication found, lacking any evidence of  V-22 flight testing prior to the Marana accident, was contained in a Navy Helicopter Training manual which applied to the much earlier and smaller TH-57 Trainer Helicopter: "Vortex Ring State - The uncontrolled rate of descent caused by the helicopter rotor encountering disturbed air as it settles into its own downwash, also known as power settling. This condition may occur in powered descending flight at low airspeeds while out of ground effect, when rate of descent approaches or equals the induced flow rate. At 300 - 600 ft/min descent, vortex ring state may begin and will not clear until exceeding 1500-3000 ft/min. Glide slope of 70 degrees (nearly vertical) seems to increase the possibility of settling. When these conditions are met, the rotor pumps air into a large bubble underneath it, which then bursts, disturbing air flow and blade thrust. Because approach angles less than 50 degrees and airspeeds of 15-30 kts allow enough new air to enter the rotor system, the TH-57 is limited to descent rates less than 800 ft/min, with airspeeds greater than 40 KIAS, and approach angles less than 45 degrees. " If in fact, this or similar helicopter flight manual were the source for the V-22 NATOPS Manual Warning - as opposed to actual flight test verification by the Contractor/Navair/NASA  - it would be a serious oversight by all involved. The application of past experience in smaller Helicopters to derive Limits for an unknown/untested laterally displaced - side by side - rotor aerodynamic system, would be a gross error. Note: It is a matter of interest that one month AFTER the mishap,  Navair issued Urgent Change No. 1 to NATOPS, adding a description of high rates of descent in VTOL Mode and the procedures to recover from this "regime" It is also of interest throughout the Jagman report, that flight in the V-22 is only discussed in a two-dimensional consideration. There is no discussion related to the fact that the V-22 must and does operate in a three-dimensional airspace. Discusion of lateral and yaw controls and their impact on the above is not presented, nor are any of the other flight situations involving Multi-Axis controls presented or discussed. As will be shown later, the only guidance found was the NATOP Limits of 2.0G and 60 Degree Angle of Bank in VTOL/Conversion mode. The reason for a Prohibition of rapid multi-axis controls is not explained so as to alert the pilots of how this impacts on the foregoing.  It appears through what little information/research is available in the public domain, that neither Navair nor NASA  had any idea or direct knowledge, through V-22 Flight testing prior to Marana, about the real flight "boundaries", other flight limits or any critical effects of maneuvering.   They do in fact appear to be arbitrary and based on earlier helicopter limitations. Despite the foregoing, the above limits/warnings in the V-22 NATOPS appear to have been incorrectly applied in the  JAGMAN and Safety Investigations in determining if pilots had exceeded them in violation of the NATOPS. c. Navair/Bell/Boeing Flight Test Performance Data Chart. This chart (attached) provides results of actual flight testing, presented to the Blue Ribbon Panel, which should have been used as the factual/experimental basis to derive the proper limits for NATOPS Flight Manual for Pilots. The average Maximum Load Factor (Nz = "G") displayed on this chart show a Maximum average of Nz = 1.15 to 1.20 'G"s for Hover/Conversion modes. Note: This indicates level flight demonstrated Load Factors. No information was given as to the Load Factor Capability in descending flight, which would have been more critical in the conditions involved in the Marana accident case. This minimal Load Factor in turn projects a Maximum  Angle of Bank of about 25-30 Degrees. Note: This estimate is also based on the level flight test only. It might actually be less in descent if the Rotors are Stall Limited. In descent the pilot would have more collective control available to use, which would make it easier to readily exceeded these minimal levels, before power (torque) limits were reached. It should also be noted that the performance envelope "goals" - as shown by the dashed lines for each nacelle angle test segment on the chart - indicate that the V-22 Goal for Load Factor in the VTOL/CONV mode  was approximately  Nz= 1.75 G's, which was significantly higher than actual testing demonstrated. d. JORD Requirement Charts, dated 15 Feb 2001   (included in Appendix to Final Blue Ribbon Panel Report). The established JORD Requirement Number 028 requires: Instantaneous G Loading of  +3.0 to -0.5 instantaneous G's in Helicopter Mode, and "     "     "     "     "    "     "        +3.5 to -1.0  "     "     "    "    "   in the Airplane Mode.  It is obvious from the performance testing  that the V-22 cannot generate +3.0 G's in the Helicopter Mode. It is therefore interesting to note that the Current Status of this requirement is Graded in Green indicating "Full Capacity Exists or Threshold Met" The inference of this claim also suggests the conclusion that a bank of 65-70 Degrees,  which has also not been (and could not be) demonstrated. No data to support this gross conclusion has been found in any test reports. The various items for  Limitations required of pilots as noted in the NATOPS are not supported by either the Flight Test Performance Charts, nor the grading shown in the JORD Requirements which has been graded as being accomplished. We now have the following variations in "G Loadings"  in Helo/Conversion mode ranging from: +1.2 G  in actual Flight Testing +2.0 G  claimed in NATOPS +1.75 G goal of Flight Test +3.0 G  claimed as completed in JORD Requirement Status Report It is obvious that the unexplained variations of information in this area of V-22 Performance capabilities and limits, are completely impossible to reconcile. (Person or persons responsible should be interviewed/investigated as necessary) e. Pilots Decisions Assuming that most Line Pilots are not aware of anything except the NATOPS limits, which are considered by pilots as their flight "Bible" (i.e., not open for argument), we can conclude that a pilots primary basis for decisions are  dependent on published limitations in the NATOPS Manual. Pilots would normally be correct in assuming (but incorrect in reality) that they could safely make 60 Degree banks at 2.0G during flight in Helo/Conversion Mode; which in reality could lead them immediately into an asymmetrical STALL. It is inconceivable, given the foregoing  that a pilot following NATOPS could be found the Cause of a mishap such as the Marana Accident.                                                2. V-22 Test Program problems directly related to Marana Accident: As related to several above reports, the testing in the 0-60 Knot airspeed ranges, which was required to provide accurate data for determining limits for NATOPS, was deferred/deleted/ignored, before the aircraft was released to line Pilots ( who were NOT Certified Flight Test Pilots ). Load Factors for VTOL/CONV Modes, as well as warnings referenced to VRS,  were apparently and wrongly adapted from other standard Helicopter NATOPS Manuals. No evidence has been seen which would allow any other conclusion to be made.                                                   3. Jagman Investigation of Marana Accident: A review of the Jagman investigation indicate that several items of interest were either ignored, missed or left out which  directly involved the findings and conclusions. Many of these would have been changed if they had been studied, evaluated, and included in the investigation. Absent the information above, it becomes apparent that insufficient data and knowledge was available to the investigators to permit more accurate/complete conclusions. Extracts from Jagman Report a. "The Mishap Aircraft's flight profile in the terminal area (high descent rate/low airspeed) most likely resulted in the aircraft experiencing a Vortex Ring State (Power Settling) and /or blade stall condition, which resulted in departure from controlled flight and the subsequent mishap" b. The report also stated that this condition is "more extreme than the results experienced in most rotorcraft to date." The Deputy Commandant for Aviation did NOT concur with this statement. Note: In the history of helicopter flight operations, we have never found a case where a Helicopter did a snap-roll onto its back and crash into the ground - because it got into a Vortex Ring State (VRS). An encounter of helicopters of a VRS condition is a very rare condition. When a former FAA Flight Test Pilot with some 40+ years of flying helicopters, was asked what comments he had to offer about the recent flurry of attention by Navair and NASA of  the "VRS" problem, he seemed surprised - and asked "What is VRS?" Given that this is a well known fact to all helicopter pilots and aero-engineers; someone should determine why the General non-concurred, and also why others - including Contractors/NAvair?USMC/NASA - have repeated similar statements!! c. "This unfortunate mishap appears not to be the result of any design, material, or maintenance factor specific to tiltrotors" This conclusion appears to be inconclusive and misleading and has been repeated for the past few years. It asserts that the V-22 Tiltrotor aircraft  "appears" not to have any design problems. Efforts by the Red Ribbon Panel over the past year has shown that this is not true. It has a very basic and major design flaw in its rotor design and configuration.  This has been demonstrated by: default of testing and performance, numerous limitations and warnings related to control uses by the pilots, and more written emergency procedures and warnings/cautions in the V-22 NATOPS flight manual than any other military/civil aircraft known in current service. Note: A thorough human factors engineering analysis of the amount of material to be absorbed by the pilots would be of great value to explain the level of difficulty required to safely operate the V-22 in combat maneuvering conditions -- which are prohibited (even after some 10+ years of flight operations). As will be seen later, the Marana accident aircraft were, by any evaluation, one of the first actual examples of routine combat maneuvering in formation at low airspeeds altitudes. They operated in an envelope area which had NOT been tested by either the Contractor or Navair. The Major Design Flaw is directly related to the laterally displaced Rotor/blade design, which produces little or no combat maneuverability.  This was reported by the Red Ribbon Panel on 14 May, 2001. The only test data known are the Six flight test Data Points shown on the Bell-Boeing/Navair Performance Flight Test Chart, which indicates a maximum limit load capability of  Nz= 1.2 "G"s. This provides  a very small 2/10 of a G margin for any maneuverability or agility, which when coupled with the Lateral  (side by side) Rotor design creates a significant and deadly design fault. This has been known or should have been known for many years. This finding is supported by (1) lack of flight test, and (2) the use of numerous warnings or cautions in the V-22 NATOPS Manual directly related to the lack of capabilities above. 1. Combat Maneuvering is prohibited. 2. Autorotations are Prohibited 3. Abrupt multi-axis control inputs are Prohibited As reported before, the V-22 is not - and cannot - be used in any terminal mission Combat area, susceptible to enemy fire. DOD studies of  rotary-wing losses in Vietnam and subsequent areas of hostility , have shown that 91% of losses were in the Terminal Mission Area. (As one of our pilots have said - it is a "sitting duck" in any Combat Situation! Another combat helicopter pilot offers that  "a Combat V-22 is an oxymoron.") The "cover phrase" added to the Gen  McCorkle comment in item c. above is:   "--factor specific to tiltrotors" . This is an intriguing phrase. The design flaw in question is ONLY a factor specifically applicable to the V-22 tiltrotor! The Major V-22  design flaw is not associated nor applicable to ANY helicopter. The use of laterally (side by side) displaced rotors creates a complex problem - which has been subject to little or no testing in low airspeed/low altitude ranges. The impact of winds, gusts, turbulence and control inputs have not been subject to any specific testing, nor any Technical Reports from either NASA or NavAir. Note: A search of both AHS (American Helicopter Society) and NASA Technical Report Databases reveals not a Single Report Addressing VRS or Maneuvering Issues with the V-22 prior to 2001! The coupling or addition of laterally displaced propulsion,  with twin rotors which have the lowest limit load factors for hover than any known Military Combat Capable Rotorcraft; results in what IS a Major Design Flaw, which SPECIFICALLY applies to only this tiltrotor - the V-22. It is a Flaw in that it has not been tested nor demonstrated that it can perform safely in its intended role as a combat capable aircraft. The Marana accident would appear to be first proof of this. Given the test results, it is believed that this aircraft would not be certifiable by the FAA for civil use. It is interesting that the Memorandum of Understanding between Navair and the FAA, which provided that the FAA flight test pilots would be directly involved in the testing of the V-22 was later waived by the Navy. Given the normal thoroughness of FAA Flight Testing Standards, it may be of interest to investigate why/how this occurred.     Roll Damping and Roll Inertia Unlike a helicopter where the tail rotor act as a large Roll Damper, and the central location of the rotor precludes any real problems with Roll Inertia; The V-22 has little or no Roll Damping, and a very large Roll Inertia. Locating the engines and transmissions and rotors at the end of the wings (even though the wings are fairly short) makes the roll inertia huge compared to a helicopter and large even by commercial airplane standards. This large inertia will mean that when a significant roll rate is established, it will be very hard to arrest by normal control inputs (differential collective). Arresting a significant roll rate caused by control inputs (maneuvering bank or turn) or a powerful external disturbance (such as flying into the wake of another aircraft) may have: 1. been beyond the pilots normal control limits, 2. beyond the power (rotor torque) limits, 3. within the control/power limits but one of the rotors stalled because of the low stall margins on these rotors and large differential collective pitch applied through the control inputs, or 4. the control response rate was just too low to be effective (aerodynamic lag). The application of differential collective in a banking situation probably helped to stall one of the rotors, promoting an even more powerful roll in the same direction. With the high roll inertia combined with the low roll damping, it could well be that this is one reason that maneuvering limits were placed on this aircraft when in helicopter mode. We suspect that this was determined early on from flight simulation work, and written into the NATOPS. If this is correct, then it may become another example of where the JORD called for a certain level of maneuvering capability and the contractors went ahead anyway hoping that they could get around this deficiency somehow, most likely by changing the JORD to fit the capabilities of the aircraft. There is NO fix or design change which will cure this Design Fault -- without a complete aircraft redesign. d. Annex A of the Jagman Report Synopsis. It is of passing interest to note that this annex discusses VRS in BOLD face print,  while 'stall' is in normal print and not capitalized. The discussion of Blade Stall correctly relates Angle of Attack (not mentioned in VRS discussion), to blade stall -- and to stall region on "one prop-rotor while decreasing the stall region on the other." 4. Asymmetric Stall Considerations The probability of Asymmetrical Stall was apparently not considered as a serious factor in the investigation, or it might have been noticed that the maneuvering of Mishap aircraft from formation high left to formation high right followed by realignment with lead aircraft,  would be a perfect setup for asymmetric stall on the right rotor. The rotor at this time enters an unusually high Blade Loading and low Stall Margin. It should be noted that none of the published reports or tests include any multi-axis control testing. All of the past TR-64 tests for examining VRS conditions have been done only with fore and aft cyclic inputs to help establish boundaries. The absence of differential lateral cyclic or rudder inputs may result in the realities that the new boundaries/limits MAY NOT be adequate or SAFE if and when any lateral or multi-axis inputs are required! Given the higher density and temperatures involved at Marana, the Nz (G's) available for maneuver would have been reduced enough (G = 1.15-1.20)  to cause any significant banking in formation maneuvers -- added with yaw pedal activation -- to exceed the Stall Margins during the interval between the approximate times of 19:57:30 (aircraft in conversion mode) and 19:57:57. There is no indication in the Jagman Report that any consideration of the relationships noted in the foregoing information and data was given. There was also no information found in the Jagman Report on pages 53-54, where some Eight or so NATOPS provisions were discussed; which might have drawn attention to the specific limits to the pilot in regard to the "incorrect" NATOPS 'G' capability,  nor the incorrect banking capability/limits for the pilots. It can reasonably be accepted that the average line pilot does keep in mind the normal/standard limits - as opposed the aircraft special limits. The fact that NATOPS could lead a pilot to believe that under the conditions for hover/conversion mode (2.0 G and 60 Degree Bank) when such capability did not exist, could easily have been the primary factor in this accident. The apparent rush or jump to discuss VRS as opposed to Asymmetric Stall apparently caused the JAG to assign fault to the pilot. There was no indication that consideration was given to the assumption that the pilot might have been following the correct or specific procedures following NATOPS stated rules/limits.  The selection of criteria for avoiding a little known phenomenon of "VRS" as opposed to clearly stated control limits in NATOPS would have been an incorrect judgment by the investigators. This would be a tragedy and should be reviewed and corrected as necessary. The Jagman Report apparently does not provide continuous readings of the CSMU (Crash Survivable Memory Unit) for the last fifty seconds of flight between the initiation of Conversion for the 2nd Aircraft; through the Crossover and bankings required during conversion to change formation sides, and the need to to get realigned with lead when he is in High-right position. The maneuvering necessary to follow lead into a left hand formation turn, while initiating conversion and maneuvering from left high to right high was not discussed in the Report. A complete time line discussion, including not only the following, but one which should include other registered CSMU parameters, might have provided Angle of bank information which would allow a second by second reconstruction to perhaps validate a rotor stall, instead of reaching a premature conclusion supporting the 'VRS' theory. Any attempt by the pilot to maneuver under the Standard NATOPS limits for helicopters of 2.0 "G"s and 60 Degree Angle of Bank would have produced an immediate right rotor stall. (Note: Airspeed has been converted to give a better view of ROD/Airspeed relationship) Time            Nacelle(Deg) AGL(ft)   ROD(fpm) Airspeed(fpm)  AS/ROD           Comments 19:57:13             0              1280        500         18,840            37.68               begin conversion 19:57:14            convers       1350        885         11,140           12.59         began crossover, unknown Bank Angle ???? 19:57:35            51              820        3945        10,229             2.59                     crossover ?? 19:57:38            73              unk        unk            unk               unk                       on right side ?? 19:57:44            90              566        150            9,317            62.11          slowed, slight balloon ?? 19:57:50            90              500         800           5,267             6.53            left bank,  3 O'clock High ?? 19:57:57            95              339         2247         4,051             1.80            multiple axis controls 19:58:03 IMPACT Note: Multiple axis controls were clearly involved in the maneuvering control actions required in formation flying. WHY WERE MULTI-AXIS CONTROL INPUTS PROHIBITED IN THE NATOPS? This should have raised a Red Flag in the JAG Investigation, that there was in fact something already known by Navair/Contractors/NASA about the V-22 maneuvering control problems. What was known that established this concern and prohibition - other than lack or cancellation of flight test -- and why wasn't it addressed properly in the NATOPS to preclude inadvertent accidents? At (:13 sec), a/c began conversion from Airplane mode to Helicopter Mode, with a rapid decrease in airspeed from 18840 fpm to 11140 fpm at (:14sec) (if CSMU correct). Between (:14sec) and (:35sec) the a/c began crossover maneuver, with unknown angle of bank, while continuing conversion from 0 Degree to 51 Degree nacelle angle, and very rapid descent required to follow lead in his descent from the IP (Initial Point). 3 Seconds later CSMU indicated at (:38 sec) that the aircraft was somewhere on "right side".  Jagman reports nacelle at 73 Degrees, but provides no data re A/S, ROD, bank angle, or AGL, for this critical time period. At (:44 sec), conversion was almost finished, with 90 Degree Nacelle, and the a/c slowed and made a "slight" balloon event. The airspeed was still slowing, and the ROD had slowed significantly from 3945 to 150 fpm. Given that between (:35 sec) and (:44sec) the a/c was in crossover maneuvering; followed by a slight balloon and needing formation correction to left a few seconds later ( :50 sec), the pilot made a left bank (of unknown amount) with an A/S to ROD ratio of about 6.53/1.  Given the several time gaps - some significant-in the Jagman Rpt, a definitive time when the aircraft may have entered a maneuvering stall or encountered VRS is hard to establish. The maneuvering time zone between :35 and :50 Seconds does show that a definitive Left Bank was made at :50Sec. It would appear that in making a Left bank, the a/c  exceeded  the aircraft's actual "G" and Banking limits (probably with about Nz=0.2 G  reserve with less than 5-10 Degree bank capability), which probably stalled out the Right rotor!  (Note: The only real guidance available to the average pilots was that NATOPS limits were 2.0G and 60 Degree Bank. The actual Bell/Boeing/Navair Flight Test Performance Chart indicates that Max Maneuver Lift reserve was about 0.2 G!! in the 0-60Knot range!!!!.) This indicates that neither the Lead aircraft nor the Accident Aircraft had sufficient maneuver margin to proceed in flight conditions (which would not have affected any other Military Helicopter). Since the NATOPS manual appears to have included incorrect information that had not been validated by any actual flight testing, any pilot left in the above situation-regardless of training to the contrary --  may have had no reason NOT to use standard banking techniques in formation maneuvering. His ignorance of this situation might well have resulted in the unnecessary deaths of all aboard the mishap aircraft. IF the CSMU data which could fill in the missing time and Bank Angle information was plotted, or if it  is  available in one of Jagman  Appendices, a complete review should be immediately accomplished! VRS is an interesting subject, but the unknown and untested results of Asymmetric Thrust and Lift parameters associated with a blade/rotor stall limits, may well be far more important to Pilots, particularly in the lower airspeed/altitude terminal mission areas which require a high degree of maneuverability under pressure. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Conclusions: Taking into consideration: 1. the conflict of statements and documents related to the Flight Testing results and the determination or signing off of incorrect G Limit factors both in NATOPS and In JORD Briefing Charts, 2. the lack of availability to put correct data, limits and proper discussions in the NATOPS Manual, 3. the lack of adequate discussion related to asymmetric configuration under various situations involving both Stalls and VRS, 4. the lack of inclusion in the 'Findings of Fact' of any scenario formation maneuvering and use of flight controls/timing which would have led to a more probable conclusion of an Asymmetric Stall, 5. the unwarranted decision to place the onus on the pilot for not complying with NATOPS, when NATOPS did not cover the relationships between Maneuvering considerations necessary to fly in formation flight (and at the same time avoiding the PROHIBITION against Combat maneuvering). Recommendations for Investigation: 1. The basis for statements by any personnel offering as facts the "sameness of the V-22 and helicopters" when such conclusions were baseless, and can lead to carelessness and accidents. 2. The basis for the administrative or negotiated elimination/deferral/deletion of tests which were required (by contract?) for use as a sound basis, for the determination compilation of correct/validated FACTS for use in the NATOPS  Flight Manual. 3. The basis for consideration by Navair for certification of airworthiness and/or clearance for Line Pilots prior to completion of flight testing and acquisition of the data required to establish proper NATOPS instructions, Limits, Warnings and Cautions. 4. The basis for decisions related to the assignment by Navair to the Contractors for the primary responsibility for the Flight Test Program requirements established under the ITT (Integrated Test Team) concept 5. Lacking adequate testing, the basis on which the Contractors and Navair used to insert in NATOPS material which was in error, false, or misleading and which would in turn lead otherwise qualified pilots into unfamiliar and dangerous situations. 6. The apparent use of outside advisors/consultants/officers, not familiar with the true performance and behavior of Asymmetric tilt rotor Propellers (as opposed to conventional helicopter rotors), and the numerous situations waiting for the uneducated pilot not familiar with the idiosyncrasies involved. 7. The degree of the management awareness of the decisions related to all of the foregoing, and any obvious misrepresentations under contract related to all of the above obvious discrepancies. 8. Given that the real primary cause was the failure in airworthiness of the unique design of the asymmetric propeller system, which had not been fully and properly tested and certified; consideration should be given to set aside any assertion or conclusion that the pilot of the mishap aircraft be deleted from all correspondence, reports and announcements related to this mishap. 9. Finally it is recommended that based on the above, that the conclusions reached by the Jagman investigation should be set aside, until and unless more testing of the aircraft related to both Asymmetric Stalls and VRS can conclude that the aircraft is certifiably safe in the same degree as that required by the FAA for transport aircraft. Note: It appears that not a single person on the Blue Ribbon Panel had any real experience in Rotorcraft aerodynamics, flight testing and operations;  which otherwise might have resulted in the discovery of most of the above findings. All of the material above was available in the briefing materials provided to them, and in the NATOPS Flight Manual. These were the same documents used by the Red Ribbon Panel in our research and studies which produced most of the foregoing materials and discussion. CONCLUSION: The above information solidly indicates that the V-22 rotor system is in fact a FLAWED Safety of Flight Design, which CANNOT be 'fixed " without  a complete aircraft re-design. It should be terminated immediately , before more men are killed. Harry P Dunn Coordinator, Red Ribbon Panel

MV-22 Lies - keeping a failed program funded

Of all the U.S. military programs facing elimination, the V-22 Osprey program is most deserving.  The MV-22 is far too expensive and too unstable to conduct combat assaults.  The February issue of G2mil contains an article "The V-22 Fiasco" which should convince any sane person that this program is deeply flawed.  An April 20, 2001 report by POGO summarizes other MV-22 problems.   Early this year,  a "blue-ribbon" panel consisting of a retired Marine General and two defense industry insiders was convened to ensure continuation of this program.  This bogus review panel traveled the nation to visit manufacturing plants where the flawed MV-22s were built, but didn't find time to drive one hour outside Washington DC to talk with the MV-22 test pilots based in Maryland.       The panel recommended that obvious technical problems should be fixed, and an expensive redesign is now underway.  The lightweight titanium hydraulic lines are too thin, so they will be replaced.  Proper testing should eliminate the software problems.  The Bell-Boeing team became aware of these problems during testing, but never fixed them, and 20 Marines died as a result.   In private business, Bell-Boeing would have paid millions of dollars to the families of the dead Marines.  They would also be expected to fix flaws in a product they produced, but in the corrupt world of U.S. military contracting, they will be paid even more money.  The Marines also want a .50 caliber gatling gun mounted, so this will further complicate matters.         Meanwhile, the production line will stay open to produce incomplete MV-22s, which will be parked until the redesign work is finished.  Then another billion dollars will be wasted to modify these 40 or more pre-production lemons.  This redesigned MV-22C should be ready to fly within a year, but will it be thoroughly tested as promised?  This would cost another billion dollars, take another two years, and may identify more problems.  As a result, Marine Generals may claim that the redesigned Osprey was already tested.   The MV-22s will be delivered to operational squadrons where pilots will face ridiculously stringent flight limitations to prevent another accident.   This is of little concern to the racketeers at Bell-Boeing and in the U.S. Congress.  Their goal is to produced as many MV-22s as possible, and then collect billions more dollars to continually "fix" problems.   They will never admit that the MV-22's design is fundamentally flawed, and will continue to look reporters and Congressmen in the eye and repeat these lies. #1 The MV-22 has twice the range of helicopters.         The MV-22 has about the same range as modern helicopters, like the new Navy MH-60S.  The Marine Corps' old CH-53E has twice the range of the MV-22, which can be verified at the Marine Corps' own website.  In those rare cases when the Marines need to fly long distances for a raid, the MH-60S can be equipped with external fuel tanks and far outrange the MV-22.  The Special Operations command already operates the MH-60G "Pavehawk" (right) with a range of 445 nautical miles, almost twice the range of the MV-22.  The MV-22 has "indefinite" range if refueled in the air, but helicopters can be fitted with booms to refuel in the air too. #2 The MV-22 has twice the speed of helicopters.       The MV-22 can reach 240 knots, while helicopters are limited to around 148 knots, so its about 62% faster, not 100%.  Even the 40-year old CH-46 can fly 145 knots.  If the MV-22 carries cargo on an external hook, it must keep its rotors upright and cannot fly any faster than helicopters. #3  The MV-22's higher speed makes it safer from ground fire.        Obviously, a faster flying aircraft is harder to hit.  However, helicopter transports flying over enemy territory are normally escorted by Cobra attack helicopters.  The armored Cobras scout ahead and engage threats, and guide the transports away from dangers.  The Cobras also stand guard over the landing zone to immediately engage threats.  Many Marines have questioned if Ospreys will operate without escorts, or fly at helicopter speeds so the Cobras can keep up.  (see the April issue of the Marine Corps Gazette)  This important issue has been ignored by Marine Generals.       The biggest danger assault transports face is in the landing zone.  To avoid a deadly loss of lift called "vortex ring state" MV-22s must descend at half the rate of helicopters.   In addition, the MV-22s generate three times more "downwash" as they land, so the danger of  damage from flying debris among a group of MV-22 is higher.  The 90knt downwash is so strong (see photo) that sea rescues are dangerous and landing in the desert causes a "brown out" where visibility is zero.  The wind is so strong and the flying debris so dangerous that landed troops must lie down in exposed fields until the MV-22s fly away.        Survivability is an even bigger issue.  Helicopters can land after a loss of engine power, by using "autorotation", the MV-22s rotors are too small, which is why unusual "test waivers" were allowed.  Minor damage to the MV-22 rotors or complex drive system can cause catastrophic results, as the first two MV-22 crashes demonstrated.  The two rotors must work perfectly in tandem, otherwise the imbalance causes the MV-22 to roll over, as the third and fourth crashes demonstrated.  Finally, if the rotors become stuck forward, the MV-22 cannot land anywhere because its rotor blades extend well below the fuselage.  During the Vietnam War, damaged helicopters landed safely thousands of times; damaged MV-22s just fall out of the sky. #4 The MV-22 can carry 24 combat equipped Marines.        The MV-22 is supposed to carry as many Marines as the CH-46E, but its cargo compartment is almost four feet shorter, and slightly narrower.  Nevertheless, the Marine Corps insists the MV-22B can carry 24 combat-equipped Marines, even after the GAO determined that only 15-18 Marines will fit.  Remember that 19 Marines died when the MV-22 flipped over during the April 11, 2000 full operational evaluation (e.g. 4 crewmen and 15 troops).       The "requirement" that a new Marine helicopter must carry 24 Marines was invented in someone's head, it is not based on a real need.  A requirement to lift a certain artillery gun or vehicle is valid, but the exact number of troops is an elastic standard.  If moving the maximum number of bodies is the goal, the Marine CH-53E (right) can carry 55 Marines, or an armored vehicle.  Articles have appeared in professional journals which argue that the Corps should forward-deploy composite squadrons consisting of 10 powerful CH-53Es and 4 CH-46Es, rather than 12 CH-46Es and 4 CH-53Es.  This mix could double the squadron's  helicopter lift, but this idea was ignored because it would threaten justification for the MV-22 program. #5  The MV-22 costs only $41 million each.       During this year (FY2001), Bell-Boeing was to receive $1208.5 million to produce 16 V-22 aircraft for the Marines, for an average cost of $76 million each.  Some of this money was recently cut and reprogrammed for the redesign.  The Marine Corps spent an average $90 million for each "pre-production" MV-22.  The Department of Navy (which funds Marine Corps aviation) had budgeted around $66 million for each full-production copy, which is traditionally optimistic.   Last year, the Navy determined the MV-22s costs had risen and cut the overall buy from 360 to 348.   A GAO study last year estimated $83 million a copy, and that was before the Marines decided to add a gun and make other enhancements. #6 It would take years to modify and test a modern helicopter like the Army's Blackhawk to operate from ships.      The new Navy MH-60S "Knighthawk" has already been fully tested and approved for full production.  It can carry a crew of four and 13 passengers or 10,000lbs of cargo.  The Marine Corps can simply sign a production contract to join in the Navy buy.  Navy H-60 spare parts and training programs have been functioning for years, the Corps already operates eight VH-60s as part of the Presidential helicopter squadron.  If the Corps joined the Army, Navy, and Air Force by adopting the Sikorsky H-60 series for basic transport, all services would save money and improve interoperability.  This year, the Navy bought 17 MH-60S for $17 million each, they would cost even less if purchased at a higher rate with a joint Marine Corps buy.  The MH-60S can carry almost as much as the MV-22, at one-sixth the price.   The Navy is impressed with the MH-60S and plans to use them to replace their CH-46D helicopters, rather than buying 48 HV-22s.        Adopting the H-60 design would allow the Marine Corps to add a new capability by modifying some MH-60S as EH-60E electronic warfare aircraft, using components already in service with the Army.   Another advantage is that the MH-60S is equipped to carry 16 Hellfire anti-tank missiles.  This would quadruple the airborne anti-tank firepower of the Marine Corps.  For example, composite squadrons which the Corps maintains forward-deployed include four Cobra attack helicopters which could be supported by 12 MH-60S carrying Hellfires and machine guns.       Another option is for the Corps to add the 43 MH-53E heavy lift helicopters which the Navy plans to retire.  The Marines plan to upgrade and overhaul 101 of its fleet of 165 nearly identical CH-53Es to a CH-53F configuration, at a cost of $20 million each.  Apparently, the funding drain of the MV-22 program will not allow all 165 CH-53Es to remain in service, even though they carry three times the cargo as the MV-22, and four CH-53Fs will cost less than one MV-22.  Canceling the MV-22 would free ample funds to rebuild all Marine CH-53Es and Navy MH-53Es to provide 208 powerful CH-53Fs for the Marines. #7 The MV-22 mishap rate is no worse than other new aircraft.        In a commentary in the February 12, 2001 issue of the Marine Corps Times, Steven Danyluk, a former Marine pilot now flying for American Airlines, wrote: "These accidents give the Osprey, which has barely 4,000 total flying hours, a mishap rate of nearly 100 per 100,000 flight hours, the statistical standard for measuring an airframe's safety record. The Marine Corps' overall safety record in 2000, excluding the MV-22, was 2.65 "Class A" mishaps per 100,000 flight hours.  With MV-22 flights averaging two hours per mission, those riding aboard an Osprey have had, to date, a 1-in-500 chance of meeting a disastrous fate.  If American Airlines operated with a similar mishap rate, it would suffer five crashes per day.  Osprey advocates say high mishap rates are not uncommon with new designs. But the new designs that experienced such mishap rates primarily came at the dawn of the jet age, in aircraft that were mostly single-pilot configurations equipped with ejection seats. In contrast, the Osprey is designed to carry 24 combat-loaded Marines with no such escape mechanism." FY96-00 Marine Class A Fght Mishap Rates  Data from the Navy Safety Center Class A Class A Flight Mishap Flight Hours Flight Mishaps Rate FY96 409,338 15 3.66 FY97 360,586 12 3.33 FY98 356,804 9 2.52 FY99 358,334 13 3.63 FY00 340,095 9 2.65 FY96-00 1,825,157 58 3.18         MV22            4,000              4        100.00         The MV-22s mishap rate is actually worse because a "Class A" mishap is one where a death occurs or over one million dollars in damage is suffered, which is not difficult for aircraft which cost around $50 million dollars.  For example, when a MV-22 flipped over and killed 19 Marines in April 2000, the other MV-22 in the flight also lost some control and suffered damage when it hit the runway hard.  It may have suffered enough damage to qualify as "Class A".  The four MV-22 crashes were total losses where everyone on board died, while most of the "Class A" mishaps in the chart were repairable damage.      Keep in mind that Marine aircraft average over 20 years of age, fly dangerous training missions in difficult weather, and are maintained by young Marines, often based overseas on ships.  The new MV-22s have been flown only carefully scripted test missions, by the best pilots in the Corps, only in ideal weather, and under care of the Corps best mechanics.   In contrast, none of the new C-17 aircraft have crashed, nor have any of the new F/A-18E.  The F-22 had one mishap where the pilot ejected safely.  The two other new military aircraft under development have suffered no mishaps; the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter and the Joint Strike Fighter. #8 The MV-22 is essential for future Marine amphibious operations.        Throughout its history, the Marine Corps has conducted successful amphibious operations without the MV-22.  Since the Navy is concerned about shore-based missile threats, the Marine Corps has embraced a concept of offloading ships from "over the horizon", which is about 25 miles offshore.  Several studies has proven this impractical, including one from the Naval War College: Logistical Implications of Operational Maneuver From the Sea, which concluded "the Navy and the Marine Corps need to keep the laws of logistics in mind if they are to distinguish campaign plans from fanciful wishes."  Even if major "over the horizon" landings becomes possible, the round-trip required for offload is less than 50 miles.  The time needed to load and offload cargo, and refuel are the same for MV-22s as helicopters, which lessens the MV-22s advantage of greater speed, which applies only to internal loads.  In any case, a CH-53E can shuttle far more cargo and troops 50 miles ashore each day than a MV-22. The MV-22 program has gutted the Marine Corps        Historically, the Marine Corps has taken pride in a lean, mean, and economical Fleet Marine Force.  During the 1980s,  the Corps entered the world of developing expensive, complex weaponry, like the MV-22.  The Corps has spent $12 billion "developing" the MV-22, which is more than it has spent on all other programs combined during its entire history.  This money could have bought 1000 new helicopters, but has yet to produce a safe aircraft.  The MV-22 was supposed to enter the fleet several years ago, but has been delayed as engineers struggle to "fix" problems.          If the MV-22 was safe and cost $30 million each, it would be a great contribution.  Unfortunately, when fatal design flaws emerged several years ago, Marine Generals refused to admit to a mistake, and committed the Corps reputation to an impossible goal of fixing a fundamentally flawed aircraft.  The problems were hidden by applying heavy pressure on Marines involved in testing and evaluating the MV-22 to lie.  Even the editors of the "Marine Corps Gazette" and Naval Institute "Proceedings" were intimidated to censor negative comments about the MV-22 program or suggestions about  alternatives.  Mildly negative comments about the MV-22 in a formal JAG Manual investigation report about the April 2000 crash were deleted by senior Marine officers.  Very few Marine Generals had any direct responsibly for the MV-22 fiasco, but LtGen Fred McCorkle (left) deserves much blame.  As a Marine MV-22 pilot told the Washington Post, "people who were my heroes all of my life are no longer my heroes."        Marine Generals refuse to accept that hard work, billions of dollars, political clout, and lying cannot overcome the laws of aerodynamics.  Billions of dollars in funding for Marine Aviation continue to flow down the Bell-Boeing rat hole as Marine Corps helicopter lift rapidly deteriorates.  If the MV-22 program were cancelled today, the Marine Corps could immediately buy dozens of MH-60S helicopters each year "off-the-shelf" at a far lower cost and free funds for a fleet of 208 powerful CH-53Fs.  The MV-22 program has failed, not because of critics, not because of bad press, and not because of a lack of funding.  The MV-22's design is fundamentally flawed.  Bell-Boeing has built enough MV-22s for every aviation museum in the nation, its time to donate them.                                                                                                          Carlton Meyer  editor@G2mil.com Carlton Meyer is a former Marine Corps officer and a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School. Letters MV-22 would not be certified by the FAA      Many years ago, new military aircraft had to be certified by the FAA before delivery.  If this were still required, the V-22 program would have died long ago.  I have a PhD in Aeronautics and spent most of my life in helicopter development.  I used the V-22 specs and did calculations to determine the safety margin for the aircraft needed to prevent dangerous stalls.  The V-22 design provides only one-third the safety margin which the FAA requires.  This is even more dangerous since the V-22 is unable to auto-rotate in the hover mode.  I've shared this information with several people involved in the program, it only made them angry.                                                                Name Withheld Ed. The July 9, 2001 issue of "Aviation Week" states that the Bell Agusta BA609 tiltrotor is similar in design to that of the larger Bell Boeing MV-22, but will be certified to commercial, not military, standards.  This is admission that the V-22 would not be certified as safe by the FAA.  V-22 lands naked Marines        Thanks for the well researched article!  One important item missing in the down wash section: in early testing, exiting Marines literally had their clothing ripped off their bodies when making a combat entry approach.  So the "exiting" procedure had to be redesigned.  Marines must follow a certain path in order to avoid fighting naked---this of course doesn't deal with the critical problem of the direction of hostile enemy fire!   David Rucker  themark@airmail.net V-22 software problems cannot be fixed       In your article you state that proper testing can eliminate the V-22s software problems.  I disagree; the V-22 is "fly-by-wire", meaning that a computer controls the aircraft, based on input from the pilot.  Even with the best computers available today, the calculations which the computer must crunch are just too numerous in the hover mode.  The V-22 computer controls two engines/rotors and must deal with changing winds, air temperature, speed, direction, weight, humidity, and air density whenever the pilot moves the stick.  As a result, control is often sluggish, sometimes taking several seconds to respond.  Sometimes the computer is overwhelmed and crashes, so be it must be reset (e.g. rebooted).  If you add the complexities of external loads or turbulence from nearby V-22s or minor pilot errors common at night or in combat zones, the V-22 will often crash from "software anomalies", which is what caused the last crash.                                                            Name Withheld      The Pentagon announced its FY2002 budget plan for the V-22.  The planned buy was cut from 16 MV-22 (Marines) and 2 CV-22s (Air Force) to 12 unflyable MV-22s.  Since the Air Force resisted pressure to order any flawed CV-22s, it signals they have accepted reality and will drop plans for 50 MV-22s.  However, the Bell-Boeing team will get an extra $410 million for R&D to try to "fix" the fundamentally flawed V-22 design, again.  Since the procurement cuts total only $231 million, the Bell-Boeing team will make even more profits during FY2002 than if the flawed V-22 had been approved for full production.  Only two V-22s will fit in an LHA Hanger      I'm in the Navy and was on the USS Saipan where the V-22 was certified as shipboard compatible.  It was designed to fit in the hanger deck of an LHA or LHD, it does, by inches, which doesn't leave room to move them around.  I estimated that we could only fit two in the hanger deck at a time.  This probably doesn't sound like a big deal, but it is.                                                        Name Withheld JSF Assault Version      This may be an impossibly naive question, but would the JSF, with it's internal bomb bay and vertical lift capability, be, with appropriate modifications, a possible substitute for for the failed V-22?  Barring that, is it possible to meet the Marine's needs with an aircraft with a frame, etc, built around the JSF's engine and flight controls?                                                      Taylor Norwitt Ed.  Great idea, I've been thinking about that for years.  It couldn't replace a helicopters cargo lift ability, but a few long-range rapid assault jet squadrons would prove valuable.  The problem is how to disembark as the downwash from a VTOL jet is too heavy.  Perhaps the Marines could be in a cargo pod which slides out the back, or they could exit the top and slide down a long extendable metal slide.  V-22 Scandal Homepage